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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STAT$ OF UTAH 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ROLAND W. REICHERT, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
Petition tfo, 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF REVIEW 
1. Whether reversal and remand of the case for a new 
trial on the issue of damages was in conflict with any decision 
of this court. 
2. Whether reversal and remand of the case to enter 
judgment for the undisputed attorneys1 fees, or make findings 
supporting their reduction, is in conflict with any decision of 
this court, or violates petitioner's procedural rights. 
3. Whether affirmance of the trial court's denial of a 
motion to add a counterclaim departed from the usual course of 
judicial proceedings to the extent calling for this court's exer-
cise of its power of supervision. 
COURT OF APPEALS CITATION 
The opinion issued by the court of appeals is reported 
unofficially in 122 Adv.Rpts. 46, The official report has not 
been published. 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
1. The decision sought to be reviewed was entered on 
November 24, 1989. 
2. There was no petition for rehearing. An order was 
entered by this court granting to petitioner until and including 
January 23f 1990, within which to petition for certiorari. 
3. There is no cross-petition. 
4. The statutory authority for exercise of jurisdic-
tion in this case is 78-2-2(5) Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
CONTROLLING LAWS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordi-
nances, or regulations involved in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Regional Sales Agency ("Regional") brought this action 
to enforce provisions of an agreement of August 13, 1979 (Peti-
tion, Appendix B) restricting the right of defendant ("Reichert") 
to compete with Regional. Reichert defended on the ground that 
the agreement he signed was not intended to have a legal effect, 
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was without consideration, and was a sham (R.28-33); and counter-
claimed, on the ground that Regional had induced him to enter 
into the agreement by fraudulent representations as to its 
purpose. 
Reichert performed services for Regional as a salesman 
from September 1, 1977, through December 31, 1983 (Tr. 9, 15-17, 
136). During his tenure with Regional, Reichert represented a 
number of the principals of the company and Was the primary, if 
not the sole, contact of Regional Sales Agency with its princi-
pals and customers (Tr. 241). According to t^he agreement, the 
"principals" were factories, manufacturers, a^ na others selling 
products in territories assigned to Regional, 
Reichert testified that during his tenure, Regional 
represented Artfaire, Carousel Party Product^ and Atlas Textiles, 
and that after he left the company, he represented those princi-
pals (Tr. 99). In answers to interrogatories, Reichert stated, 
under oath, that he had received from Artfaire, Atlas Textiles 
and Carousel Party Products during the three jyears following 
December 31, 1983, commissions totalling $42,176.09 (Exhibit 
"P-9"). The case was tried to a jury, but prior to the submis-
sion of the case, the parties stipulated that the attorneys' fees 
to be awarded, if any, would be determined by the court after 
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return of the jury's verdict. The jury found in favor of 
Regional, but assessed damages in the amount of only $792.18, and 
volunteered that the parties should pay their own attorneys' 
fees. 
After rendition of the verdict, Regional submitted to 
the court a sworn statement, together with a summary of services 
performed and the purposes for which they were performed, 
together with an affidavit that reasonable fees and costs totaled 
$27,350.90 (R. 313-325). No objection was made to the affidavit, 
no motion was made to strike it, and no counteraffidavit was 
filed by Reichert. The court considered the matter on its law 
and motion calendar at which time, without a hearing, it reduced 
to $7,500 the attorneys' fees to be awarded to Regional. At that 
time the court also denied Regional's motion for a judgment 
n.o.v. and for a new trial. 
The finding that the noncompetition agreement was valid 




The Reversal of the Trial Court's Judgment and Remand 
of the Case for a New Trial on Damages Alone was Based 
Upon Prior Decisions of This Court 
Paragraph "L" of the 1979 agreement between Regional 
and Reichert contained the following provision: 
At no time during the term of this agreement, or 
within a period of three years following the termina-
tion of Agent's employment shall Agent, for himself or 
in behalf of any other person, firni, partnership or 
corporation, (other than Company) rjepresent any princi-
pal of company for the purpose of selling any of the 
products; nor will he with respect to the Products in 
any way, directly or indirectly, fdr himself * * * 
solicit, divert, or take away any Principal of Company 
during the term of this agreement qr for the three 
years following the termination of Agent's employment. 
In the event Agent breaches the provisions of this 
paragraph, all proceeds and benefits derived therefrom 
by Agent shall be received and held by him in trust for 
Company, and shall be paid to Company upon demand by 
Company. (R-ll). 
On the basis of this provision and Reichert's own 
admission that he had received $42,176.09 for representing three 
i 
of the principals of the company during the three years following 
termination of his employment, Regional askeq for the following 
instruction to the jury: 
Plaintiff is entitled to recover, in addition to 
any other damages, that it may prove by a preponderance 
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of the evidence, all commissions received by defendant 
during the years 1984, 1985, and 1986, from Artfaire, 
Carousel Party Favors, Inc. and Atlas Textiles. 
The court refused to give Regional1s requested instruc-
tion No. 8, but gave the following instruction: 
Where the parties agree on a method of establish-
ing damages for breach of contract, the agreement is 
enforceable if it is designed to provide fair compensa-
tion for the breach, based upon a reasonable relation 
to actual damages. 
Regional1 s request for instructions was based by the 
decision of this court in Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Stan-
dard West, 755 P.2d 162, 164 (1988), in which the trial court had 
held that in order for the plaintiff to establish his liquidated 
damages, it had to prove actual damages. This court reversed and 
remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with the liquidated 
damages provision of the contract, saying: 
In general, contractual damages are measured by 
the lost benefit of the bargain, i.e., "the amount nec-
essary to place the non-breaching party in as good a 
position as if the contract had been performed." 
Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982). However, 
as a general rule, parties to a contract may agree to 
liquidated damages in case they breach, and such agree-
ments are enforceable if the amount of liquidated dam-
ages agreed to is not disproportionate to the possible 
compensatory damages and does not constitute a forfei-
ture or a penalty. Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47 
(Utah 1983). Reasonable liquidated damages provisions 
may reduce the cost of liquidation by obviating the 
expense entailed in proving actual damages. If a 
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liquidated damages provision is enforceable, a plain-
tiff need not prove actual damages. [citations omit-
ted.] The burden is on the party who would avoid a 
liquidated damages provision to prove that no damages 
were suffered or that there is no reasonable relation-
ship between compensatory and liquidated damages. 
[Emphas i s added.] 
The court of appeals relied upon Young Electric Sign in 
deciding this case, noting that "Mr. Reichert does not point to 
any evidence offered below to show that the liquidated damages 
provision was unreasonable." 
It is also generally held that a determination of the 
enforceability of a liquidated damages provision is a matter for 
the court and not the jury. Chaff in v. Ramsey, 276 Or. 551, 555 
P.2d 459, 462 (1976); In re Construction Diversification, Inc.y 
36 B.R. 434, 436 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Corvino y. 910 South Boston 
Realty Co. . 332 P.2d 15, 18 (Okl. 1958); 22 iVm. Jur.2d, Damages, 
S 692. 
II. 
The court of appeals followed accepted procedures in 
reversing and remanding the case to either enter 
judgment for the undisputed attorneys' fees or make 
findings supporting the reduction made by the trial 
court. 
Regional1s motion for award of attorneys1 fees was 
called up for hearing on the law and motion calendar at which 
time it was heard by the court without setting it for a hearing 
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or taking any testimony with respect to it. The court simply 
asked counsel for Reichert what he thought, whereupon he sug-
gested to the court that ten times the amount of judgment would 
be excessive and unreasonable, whereupon Judge Brian entered 
attorneys1 fees in the amount of $7,500, a few dollars less than 
ten times the jury's verdict (Petitioner's brief, p. 10). 
Petitioner has argued that since no record was made of 
the proceeding, the court should assume that the record supports 
the judgment. There is, however, a record of the relief sought 
and the court's ruling, but no findings of fact as required by 
Rule 52, U.R.Civ.P. This was not the type of motion exempted by 
the rule. 
The cases cited by petitioner do not touch upon the 
issue that was before the trial court. Powers v. Gene's Building 
Materials, 567 P.28 174 (Utah 1977) dealt with failure to grant 
an off-the-record motion for disqualification of a judge. In 
Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982), the trial 
judge did announce a reason for his action on attorneys' fees, 
and in First Security Bank of Utah v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 567 
(Utah 1974), the trial court had made and entered findings of 
fact. 
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In Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985), 
this court said: 
An award of attorneys' fees must generally be made on 
the basis of findings of fact supported by the evidence 
and appropriate conclusions of law. 
Factors to be considered in an attorneys' fee award, as 
set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah 
1988), included the amount of the judgment, and if this is what 
motivated the court, there is no problem in sending it back 
because the judgment is certain to be increased. 
III. 
The Trial Court's Denial of Petitioner's Motion 
to Add a Counterclaim Was Not an Abuse of Discretion 
The complaint in this case was filed on January 26, 
1984, and Reichert was served on February 1. ' His answer and 
counterclaim averred that the agreement of August 13, 1979, was a 
"sham" and was never intended by the parties Ito have any legal 
effect, and that Regional1s attempt to enforce the agreement was 
fraudulent because of representations made to Reichert as to the 
ined the same 
ial, which commenced 
purpose of the agreement. The pleadings rema 
through the discovery period and until the tr 
on May 1, 1987, before The Honorable Leonard H. Russon, without a 
jury. On the day before the trial, Reichert filed a counterclaim 
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seeking to raise the issue of whether, throughout the period from 
1977 through 1983, Regional had paid to him all of the commis-
sions to which he was entitled under the 1979 agreement. On 
motion of Regional at the trial on May 1, 1987, the tendered 
counterclaim was stricken. 
In his petition, Reichert states that "Due to the con-
duct of Mrs. Kiholm while testifying and the responsive conduct 
of the bench, Judge Russon, in chambers with counsel for peti-
tioner present, offered to recuse himself, and that offer was 
subsequently accepted by petitioner." The statement about the 
conduct of Mrs. Kiholm is not in the record, and it is not true. 
The problem arose because of Reichert's counsel's continuing to 
argue with the court after rulings upon objections to evidence, 
and the judge's calling him into chambers to chastise him for it. 
It was because of the judge's anger that he offered to recuse 
himself, but thereafter said he would continue the trial unless 
Reichert insisted on the recusal, which Reichert did.-
After a mistrial was declared, the case was assigned to 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian, whereupon petitioner's motion to add 
Although this is not in the record, either, untrue state-
ments of the type made by counsel in the petition should not 
go unchallenged. 
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a counterclaim designated as a "motion to amend" the counter-
claim, was renewed. Judge Brian denied the motion and denial of 
the motion was proper under the rules and the decisions of this 
court. 
Although Reichert purported to be moving pursuant to 
Rules 15(a) and (d), U.R.Civ.P., the motion had to be under Rule 
13(e), which provides: 
When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, 
or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set 
up the counterclaim by amendment. 
In support of the motion to add the counterclaim, 
Reichert did not attempt to show any circumstances constituting 
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or requirements of 
justice, to add a counterclaim that was repugnant to his theory 
of the case and his previously sworn affidavit and deposition. 
Moreover, his renewed motion, after denial of the motion by Judge 
Russon, violated 78-7-19 Utah Code Annotated, which provides: 
If an application for an order, made to a judge of 
a court in which the action or proceeding is pending, 
is refused in whole or in part, or is granted condi-
tionally, no subsequent application for the same order 
can be made to any other judge, except of a higher 
court; but nothing in this section applies to motions 
refused for any informality in the papers or proceeding 
necessary to obtain the order or to motions refused 
with liberty to renew them. 
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The motion was made, apparently, because Reichert 
finally saw the possibility that his testimony as to a sham 
agreement would not be believed. 
CONCLUSION 
The case was decided correctly by the court of appeals 
and there being no basis for review pursuant to Rule 43 of the 
rules of this court, the petition for a writ of certiorari should 
be denied, 
DATED this J^_ day of February 1990. 
BryceE Roe (Signed) 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1*- day of February 
1990, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and 
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correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, to: 
Ephraim Fankhauser, Esq. 
243 East 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BER:013190A 
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